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Abstract 
The sweeping changes made to social security law following the election of the National Government in 1990 have had 
major repercussions on employmenllaw. This paper examines the developing law on matters such as the 26 week 'stand 
down' for worlcers dismissed for misconduct, in the light of decisions of the Social Security Appeal Authority and the 
Employment Coun and policy guidelines formulated by the Department of Social Welfare and the New Zealand 
Employment Service. 
Since social security benefits for the unemployed were 
first introduced. argument has taken place as to the effect, 
if any, of the existence of the benefit on the 'will to worlc'. 
The debate has taken many forms, but has tended to centre 
on the relative economic advantage, if any, of receiving a 
benefit as against a low wage, and perceived correspond-
ing disincentives to take poorly paid or unpleasant jobs. 
Of less importance in policy terms, but of obvious weight 
in terms of those holding jobs which they are about to lose, 
are the sanctions provided by the social security system for 
those unemployed people who are seen as having aban-
doned worlc voluntarily or as having lost work because of 
reasons within their own control (for example, after being 
dismissed for misconduct). It is this latter area which will 
form the basis for discussion in this paper. 
The introduction of mandatory sanctions 
Under the now-repealed s 60( 6) of the Social Security Act 
1964 there was discretionary authority to postpone the 
commencement of the unemployment benefit for a period 
not exceeding six weeks, or to terminate any benefit 
already grnnted where, amongst other things, the applicant 
had voluntarily become unemployed without a good and 
sufficient reason; or had lost his or her employment by 
reason of any misconduct as a worker. 
These conditions, which were seen to "test the worthiness 
of the individual to receive the benefit" (Department of 
Social Welfare, 1971) provided the most controversial 
aspect of the administration of the unemployment benefit. 
The underlying rationale of s 60(6) was that qualifying 
unemployment must be the result of extrinsic considera-
tions rather than resulting from the applicant's or benefi-
ciary's own volition or state of health (Hughes, 1990, 
13175). The maximum six week period of non-entitle-
ment was rarely imposed. 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 1994 
Shortly after the election of the National Government in 
1990, the period of non-entitlement was changed from a 
maximum of six weeks (which was only rarely imposed in 
practice) to a mandatory period of 26 weeks. This new 
provision resulted from a proposal by the Minister of 
Social Welfare in a Report to the Cabinet Strategy Com-
mittee "to provide a clear message that anyone voluntarily 
unemployed cannot expect to look to the welfare system 
for continued support" (Shipley, 1990a, 4). The Report 
had expressed suspicion that the earlier discretionary sys-
tem was encouraging manipulation and careless adminis-
tration. Introducing the bill, the Minister stated that 
"Individuals must take responsibility for their own actions 
where they put their own jobs in jeopardy through miscon-
duct. or where they give up an income without first 
securing an alternative source of income" (Shipley, 199la, 
4 ). However, the Treasury Brief to the Incoming Govern-
ment. in dealing with Social Welfare, had viewed the issue 
of stand-down periods in terms of allocation of risk: 
A voidable risk is best carried by those who can influ-
ence it and unavoidable risk carried by those best placed 
to insure against it The former suggests that ... benefi-
ciaries should probably face some direct costs of social 
services when they can influence their demand for these 
services ... This can be achieved using instruments like 
stand-down periods for benefits. (NZ Treasury, 1990, 
98) 
Apparently. however, the mandatory six-month stand-
down was proceeded with against Treasury advice 
(Stephens, 1992). Whilst the Minister of Labour at the 
time, the Hon WB Birch, denied that the social security 
changes (including dramatic cuts in basic rates) were 
linked with the simultaneous labour market changes, the 
then Minister of Finance (the Hon Ruth Richardson) and 
Minister of Social Welfare (the Hon Jenny Shipley), were 
artless in contrast. emphasising the clear link between the 
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two (Richardson, 1991; Shipley, 199lb). 
The statutory provisions 
Section 60H of the Social Secmity Act 1964 provides that 
a mandatory 26 week period of non-entitlement from 
unemployment benefit (commonly called a "stand down") 
may be imposed if the Director -General is satisfied that an 
applicant for an unemployment benefit has become unem-
ployed without a good and sufficient reason or has volun-
tarily left a Government-assisted scheme without a good 
and· sufficient reason (subs (2). The same mandatory 
period of non-entitlement applies if an applicant has be-
come unemployed or ceased to be part of such a scheme by 
reason of misconduct (subs 3). In the case of misconduct, 
the Director-General has a discretion to pay the benefit 
conditionally on the basis that, should misconduct be 
proved at a later hearing by a court or other relevant 
authority, the benefit paid becomes repayable (subs (3)). 
In practice the Director-General's discretion is delegated 
to departmental officers under s 10 of the 1964 Act These 
officers are guided in the exercise of their functions under 
the legislation by a series of policy manuals. There is 
provision for review of delegated decisions by a benefit 
review committee (s lOA of the 1964 Act), each of which 
are constituted of two depm bnental officers and one com-
munity representative, and ultimately appeal to the inde-
pendent Social Security Appeal Authority (Black, Harrop, 
Hughes, 1994, [1010A2]- [1012R.2]). 
Understandably, given the draconian nature of the penalty, 
the Social Security Appeal Authority has indicated that it 
is important to conduct the review process as quickly as 
possible in such cases (SSAA Decision No 34/93, unre-
ported). 
As the Main Benefits Manual notes, .. there is no discretion 
about the length of non-entitlement (the provisions do not 
allow for any warning to be given)" (Departtnent of Social 
Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5002). 
We can now look at the grounds for imposing a stand-
down. These reflect, but are not identical to, those in the 
now-repealed s 60(6). The 26 week period of non-entitle-
ment can be imposed under s 60H in relation to an appli-
cant who: 
* has become unemployed without a good and sufficient 
reason: 
* or has become unemployed through misconduct 
Voluntary unemployment 
Under s 60H(2): 
If the Director-General is satisfied that an applicant for 
a benefit-
(a) has voluntarily become unemployed without good 
and sufficient reason; or 
(b) has been in receipt of payments under a Govern-
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ment-assisted scheme which the Director-General 
considers analogous to a benefit and has voluntarily 
ceased to be part of that scheme without good and 
sufficient reason - the applicant shall not be entitled 
to a benefit for a period of26 weeks commencing on 
the date on which the applicant's employment, or 
participation in that scheme, ceased, as the case may 
be. 
Government assisted schemes include such schemes as the 
Conservation Corps. In addition, the Main Benefits Manual 
treats TOPS training courses, or other courses for which 
Training Benefit is paid, as being analogous to employ-
ment (para 10.5025). However, this is arguably incorrect 
People committed to such a course are not "employed" in 
any technical sense of that word, thus rendering paragraph 
(a) inapplicable. Nor are they receiving payments "analo-
gous to a benefit" under paragraph (b), since they are in 
receipt of a categorical benefit under Part I of the 1964 Act. 
Administrative guidelines on procedure 
The Main Benefits Manual instructs departmental staff 
applying s 60H(2) to take care to ensure that personal 
contact is made with the applicant as it is not sufficient to 
decide a case solely on the employer's UB5 (Verification 
of employment) information; 
* in cases of conflicting evidence the applicant must be 
given a chance to outline their version of the circum-
stances; 
* the applicant gets the benefit of any doubt if the reason 
for leaving employment is not clear or ag~eed between 
the employer and the employee; and 
* [staff are] sensitive when making enquiries (Department 
of Social Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5012) 
The Appeal Authority decisions, discussed below, indi-
cate that these guidelines are not always observed. 
''Voluntariness" 
The two key elements under s 60H are voluntariness and 
the absence of a good and sufficient reason. For an 
applicant to have become unemployed "voluntarily" prima 
facie implies a measme of choice and appears to preclude 
cases where the applicant is dismissed. This approach 
would confine the application of the stand-down in respect 
of dismissed employees to those dismissed for misconduct 
under s 60H, discussed below. Against this, there are 
circumstances where an employee's behaviour might fall 
short of misconduct but nevertheless lead to a predictable 
dismissal. For example, repeated and unjustified absences 
due to minor "illness". Is an employee in this position -
having been dismissed -properly described as "voluntar-
ily" unemployed? 
British decisions, where the concept of voluntariness is 
adopted in the same context, have construed the word 
"voluntarily" broadly so as to extend to "cases cf termina-
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tion by the employer which are instigated by the employee 
but which do not amount to misconduct" (Ogus and 
Baren~ 113). However, this app:oach, when applied to s 
60H in cases falling short of wilful repudiation of the 
contract of employment, would effectively read into the 
1964 Act a "deeming" provision which is not statutorily 
provided for. Thus, in SSAA Decision No 107/92, unre-
ported. the appeUant had been dismissed after a letter of 
warning that he would lose his job if the standard of his 
work did not improve. The Department then immediately 
declined his application for an unemployment benefit, 
notwithstanding his argument that he was dismissed be-
cause of incompetence rather than misconduct The Ap-
peal Authority held that 
Whatever the reasons for the appellant's dismissal, they 
did not amount to misconduct They certainly gave the 
District Review Committee no basis at all for deciding 
the appeUanthad voluntarily become unemployed with-
out good and sufficient reason. The fact that he was 
dismissed and would have retmned to his employment 
but for that dismissal gives the lie to that finding since 
it is not possible to be dismissed and voluntarily become 
unemployed at the same time and from the same job. 
The Department's policy as expressed in the Main Ben-
efits Manual is to apply s 60H(2) also to those who have 
been self-employed and "who close or sell a viable busi-
ness without a good and sufficient reason" (Department of 
Social Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5025). 
Under the proviso to s 58(1) of the 1964 Act, a person is not 
entitled to an unemployment benefit if the Director-Gen-
eral is satisfied that, amongst other things, that person is 
not employed because of a strike either by himself or 
herself <r by fellow membersofhisorherunion at the same 
place of employment The Main Benefits Manual states 
that 
H employees are dismissed by an employer, their em-
ployment relationship tenninates. They cannot be 
regarded as being on strike even though the circum-
stances for which they were dismissed may be regarded 
as constituting strike action. Such employees are not 
precluded by section 58(1), Social Security Act 1964 
from receiving UB. However, the extended stand-
down period imposed by s 60H, Social Security Act 
1964 might apply, depending on the circumstances. 
(Department of Social Welfare, 1993~ para 10.7014) 
By implication, then, the Department might treat dismissal 
because of strike action as being due either to voluntary 
unemployment or misconduct. Arguably, a dismissal 
cannot fall into the former category for the reasons elabo-
rated above. It seems strongly questionable whether the 
statutory scheme, providing as it does for a separate 
category of non-entitlement in relation to strikes under s 
58, is properly observed by treating strikes as "miscon-
duct" under s 60H. 
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''Good and sufficient reasons" 
What amounts to a "good and sufficient reason" is not 
defined and the phrase is not susceptible to any but the 
broadest of guidelines. Perhaps the clearest example is the 
forced resignation arising from a constructive dismissal. 
Such a dismissal occurs where the employer's behaviour 
either obliges or sbongly tends to induce the worker to 
resign (Mazengarb, para ill.21). The threat "Resign or be 
fired" is an example of the former. Sexual harassment is 
an example of the latter and recognised as such by the 
Department of Social Welfare's Main Benefits Manual, so 
that an employee who leaves employment because of 
sexual harassment will not be deemed to have become 
voluntarily unemployed regardless of whether action is 
taken to report the problem (Department of Social Wel-
fare, 1993a, para 10.5021). 
Various featmes of existing employment may justify an 
employee in leaving. Examples given in the Main Benefits 
Manual include a requirement to travel an unreasonable 
distance to get to work, a job which is too heavy or one 
which falls outside the applicant's capabilities, unavail-
ability of adequate child care arrangements or a significant 
change in conditions of employment (for example, the 
introduction of shift work for a person with a young 
family) (Department of Social Welfare. 1993a. para 
10.5021). Some of these examples may amount to a 
constructive dismissal, depending on the circwnstances. 
In SSAA Decision No 150,'92, unreported, the appellant 
had left work at an orchard six weeks before his employer 
estimated that work would have run out. His reasons for 
leaving were said to be accommodation difficulties since 
his mother, with whom he had been living, was due to leave 
New Zealand and his estimate that there were only a couple 
of weeks' work left. The Department imposed a 26 week 
stand down on the basis that the appellant had voluntarily 
become unemployed without a good and sufficient reason. 
Upholding the Department's action, the Appeal Authority 
held that 
Whatever the reason for leaving the job, it does not 
appear to relate to the job itself. There is no suggestion 
that the job was unsatisfactory, or that the appellant felt 
unsuited to it, or that relations between him and his 
employer or the other employees were less than satis-
factory. These are the kinds of reasons that may 
constitute good and sufficient reason for becoming 
voluntarily unemployed under ss 60H Social Security 
Act 1964. That list is not exhaustive but it is difficult to 
include in it the reasons advanced by the appellant for 
leaving the job. If accomodation was a problem, it 
would remain so, regardless of whether he was em-
ployed in this particular area or not. H there were only 
a couple of weeks left to work then it is difficult to 
understand why the appellant did not remain on to work 
them out. 
It is clear, therefore, that the appellant became voluntar-
ily unemployed and that he did so without good and 
sufficient reason such that the Department was left with 
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no alternative but to impose the mandatory stand down 
period provided in s 60H of the Act. 
If the Appeal Authority was suggesting as a general 
principle that "good and sufficient reason" under s 60H 
must relate to the job itself, it was arguably incorrect. Such 
an approach would place an unwarranted gloss on the plain 
words of s 60H, which do not limit the concept of "good 
and sufficient reason" in this way. There are many 
justifiable reasons for leaving employment which do not 
relate directly to the employment itself. As examples, one 
might consider an employee who moves out of the imme-
diate area or who takes on additional child care responsi-
bilities. 
The decision also illustrates the essentially punitive nature 
of the mandatory 26 week stand down period. On the 
strongest case against the appellant, he left work six weeks 
before his employment would have terminated. Had he 
worked this period out, he might then have expected a 
stand down of two weeks under s 60 before becoming 
entitled to an unemployment benefit In other words, his 
entitlement to an unemployment benefit would have arisen 
eight weeks after he actually left employment. As a 
consequence of the mandatory nature of the 26 week stand 
down. and assuming that he would not have found further 
work, the penalty for leaving six weeks early was depriva-
tion of an unemployment benefit for a further eighteen 
weeks. 
The Appeal Authority has since held that the test for what 
is a "good and sufficient reason" is objective. In SSAA 
Decision No 87/94, unreported, the a six month stand 
down had been imposed on the appellant after he had 
resigned from a job and moved to Christchurch from 
another centre partly because of insufficient prospects for 
career advancement and partly in order to pursue a rela-
tionship with his girlfriend, who lived in Christchurch. 
The Appeal Authority held that: 
The rationale behind s 60H Social Security Act 1964 
seems to be that if a person by their own actions 
becomes unemployed then they cannot rely on the State 
to provide them with an iocome until they find another 
job or six months has elapsed, whichever is the earlier. 
In other words, the provision contains a negative incen-
tive to ensure that potential beneficiaries obtain alterna-
tive employment prior to terminating their current em-
ployment If this is the case then it follows that a 
subjective assessment of whether employment has been 
surrendered for good and sufficient reason would all but 
render this provision nugatory. 
The Appeal Authority went on to hold that, measured 
against the standard of what would generally be regarded 
as good and sufficient reasons, the reasons advanced by the 
appellant - whilst understandable - were insufficient and 
the imposition of the stand down was upheld. 
The bargaining environment created by the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 has affected decision-making in this 
308 
area. In SSAA Decision No 19/93. unre~ the appel-
lant had been laid off as a freezing worker at the end of the 
season and he was offered renewed employment only on 
condition that he signed an individual contract and that he 
would not use the Meatworkers Union as his bargaining 
agent He believed that he would be unable to survive in 
this environment, without union services, and declined. 
The Deparnnent then treated him as being voluntarily 
unemployed and imposed a 26 week stand-down. The 
Appeal Authority reversed the decision, holding that 
The appellant felt completely unable to work effec-
tively in the new work environment because of the 
difficulties that he perceived that he would have in 
communication with fellow workers and the manage-
ment 
For this particular person that reason was a good and 
sufficient reason for faiJing to enter into the fresh 
employment contract because it created (again, for this 
particular person) a new and different employment 
environment and one in which the appellant believed he 
would not survive. 
In this case, it is very doubtful whether the statutory criteria 
applied in any event Due to the seasonal nature of the 
employment, in legal tenns the applicant would have had 
his contract terminated at the end of the season (NZ Meat 
Workers, etc, Union Inc v Richmond Ltd, unreported, 
Employment Court, WLC 50/92). A point overlooked by 
the Department and, ultimately, the Appeal Authority is 
that he could not then be said to have become voluntarily 
"unemployed" because he refused a new contract At the 
time of refusal, he was not employed. 
This confusion is reflected in the Main Benefits Manual 
which subsumes under discussion of s 60H(2) the example 
of a person who "refuses an employment offer" carrying 
less than the minimum wage, the clear implication being 
that refusal of one job offer at minim urn rates might justify 
the application of s 60H(2). This is clearly not the case. 
Section 601( 1 )(b) confmes the 26 week stand down in such 
circumstances to those who decline two offers of suitable 
employment without good and sufficient reason whilst 
receiving an unemployment benefit 
It may be noted that those leaving employment could be 
under an obligation to look for alternative work while still 
employed, since one condition of eligibility for an unem-
ployment benefit under s 58 is that the applicant has taken 
reasonable steps to obtain suitable work. Presumably 
though, the reasonableness of such steps will depend on 
the measure of urgency entailed in the reason for leaving 
employment 
Relationship witb personal grievances 
Section 60H(3) provides for a benefit to be paid in relation 
to misconduct dismissals where the applicant is challeng-
ing the decision to dismiss through a court or analogous 
body, pending the decision on the challenge. There is no 
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similar provision in relation to voluntary tennination with-
out a good and sufficient reason, although apparently 
'voluntary' cases of tennination by employees are fre-
quently challenged through the personal grievance proce-
dure as amounting to constructive dismissals (Mazengarb 
para [27 .11]). The failure to ameliorate the immediate 
effects of a stand-down in these cases in the same manner 
as for "misconduct" dismissals is a major lacuna in the Act 
and heightens the need for extreme caution on the part of 
those administering the stand-down provisions. This is 
particularly the case because an employer faced with a 
personal grievance action based on alleged constructive 
dismissal is scarcely likely to admit to the Department that 
the employee concerned did not leave voluntarily. when 
that admission might be produced as evidence in the 
personal grievance hearing. Some employers might be 
tempted to falsify the reasons for the employee's departure 
with a view to enhancing their prospects of success in the 
personal grievance action (see, by analogy, Ashton v 
Shoreline Hotel, unreported, Employment Court, 12 April 
1994, CEC 10/94). 
"Loss of employment because of misconduct 
as an employee" 
Under s 60H(3), a stand-down may be imposed if the 
Director-General is satisfied that an applicant for a benefit 
has lost his or her employment because of misconduct as 
an employee or has ceased to be part of a Government-
assisted scheme which the Director-General considers 
analogous to a benefit by reason of any misconduct. Once 
a decision is taken to impose a stand-down, the applicant 
is not entitled to a benefit for a period of 26 weeks 
commencing on the date on which the applicant's employ-
ment or participation in that scheme ceased. 
There is one qualification. The Department of Social 
Welfare may concede entitlement to a benefit on the 
condition that if a Court, person, or body authorised by law 
to determine the matter determines the misconduct to be 
proved, the Director-General, in his or her discretion, may 
direct that any payments of the benefit made during the 26 
weeks commencing on the date on which the applicant's 
employment or participation in the scheme ceased, shall be 
repayable. If the Director-General so directs, those pay-
ments are recoverable under section 86( 1) of the 1964 Act 
as if they were instalments of a benefit in excess of the 
amount to which the beneficiary was entitled. 
This qualification has been identified as one cause of the 
'backlog' in grievance decisions in the Employment Tri-
bunal. It has been argued by employers that, with the 
prospect of six months without income, applicants have 
little to lose from bringing a personal grievance claim 
which then entitles them to short term income support 
under the 1964 Act (Labour Select Committee, 41). No 
evidence has been advanced to support this assertion. 
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Discretion 
It is clear that s 60H(3) confers a discretion on the Depart-
ment In SSAA Decision No 159,92, unreported, the 
Appeal Authority held in this context that 
The decision whether to impose the stand down pursu-
ant to section 60H(3) involves a two-stage process: the 
Department must first determine whether an applicant 
has lost their employment because of their misconduct 
as an employee; it must then exercise a discretion 
whether to impose the stand down. Implicit in the first 
stage of this process is the necessity to conduct a 
thorough investigation into the reasons for an appli-
cant's dismissal. It is not enough to rely uncritically 
upon an employer' s version of the events leading up to 
the dismissal. That version must be put to the applicant 
and if there is any conflict further investigations must be 
made. This may involve seeking some advice from the 
relevant union or the Department of Labour as to 
whether the alleged behaviour leading to the dismissal 
amounts to misconduct 
On the facts in this case there was held to have been a 
complete failure by the Department in this respect: it had 
done no more than satisfy itself that the applicant had lost 
a place on an ACCESS course. The stand-down was 
imposed as soon as notice of this was received from the 
course provider, without asking for the appellant' s version 
of events. 
in SSAA Decision No 50/92, unreported, the Appeal 
Authority held that it was implicit in the second stage of the 
two-stage test elaborated above that the Department is 
required to consider the particular circumstances of each 
applicant's case ~ order to determine whether they were 
sufficiently serious to warrant a stand-down. In that case, 
a worker who had received two prior warnings for unre-
lated disciplinary matters was dismissed when he arrived 
at work late after injuring his wrist The stand-down was 
imposed automatically without even contacting the em-
ployer. When the employer was contacted, the information 
he provided was not put to the appellant When the appel-
lant provided his version of events, it was disregarded. The 
Appeal Authority held that: 
The Department has been able to provide no indication 
that it did any more than satisfy itself that the appellant 
lost his job because of misconduct There appears to 
have been a complete failme to consider exercising the 
discretion at all, in that the stand-down was imposed 
simply upon conf1111lation that the appellant was dis-
missed for misconduct 
The Department has a responsibility to ensure that the 
discretion in s 60H(3) is seen to be exercised in cases of 
serious misconduct ... In the appellant's case it is at least 
arguable that he was dismissed because of his miscon-
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duct the written warning received by him previously 
did not relate to the reason be was dismissed; the 
employer failed to follow its own procedures when it 
dismissed him; he had a valid reason for being late; he 
could have taken sick leave and thereby protected his 
job. 
The need for caution is emphasised by the potential for 
employer's to abuse the power which s 60H confers on 
them. In Ashton v Shoreline Hotel, unreported, Employ-
ment Com4 12 April 1994, CEC 10/94, Chief Judge 
Goddard found during a personal grievance hearing that an 
employer's claim to the Department that the employee had 
been given written warnings before being dismissed for 
misconduct was false, adding that: 
The motive for making these particular false statements 
knowingly could only have been to hann the appellant 
by giving the Director-General of Social Welfare 
grounds to decline the appellant a benefit for the first 26 
weeks of his unemployment ... 1be respondent may 
well have thought that if financially embarrassed, the 
appellant might be disabled from pursuing his personal 
grievance, or it may have been actuated by some 
antipathy towards the appellant 
''Lost his or her employment" 
The first question in relation to the substance of s 60H(3) 
is the meaning of 'lost his or her employment'. The 
reference in the clause to an applicant who has 'lost his or 
her employment' by reason of misconduct is wide enough 
to include cases of disciplinary suspension where the 
contract still subsists. In practice, consideration of such 
cases under s 60H will be rare since few current employ-
ment contracts provide for disciplinary suspension and, of 
those that do, suspension is usually contemplated as a 
short-term stand-down pending investigation of a com-
plaint and notification to the worker' s union. Such action 
would fall within the 14 day stand-down period under s 60 
of the 1964 Act 
"As an employee" 
In referring to misconduct "as an employee", the clause 
carries the clear implication that the misconduct in ques-
tion must arise out of, or in connection with, the employ-
ment Thus, it will preclude cases where the dismissal is 
founded on misconduct outside the employment which 
nevertheless renders the worker unfit for his or her job. 
The most common examples of such misconduct are the 
dismissal of workers holding positions of trust following 
conviction for dishonesty and dismissals consequent on 
the loss of some necessary trade qualification, such as a 
licence, through disciplinary action by a professional or 
trade association. 
The original internal guidelines in para 10.503 1 of the 
Department of Social Welfare's Main Benefits Manual, 
operative until December 1993, were potentially too wide 
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at this point, since they referred to "conviction of a crimi-
nal offence relevant to the employment", phraseology 
which would have covered criminal convictions sustained 
as the result of misconduct outside work as the result of 
which dismissal occured. 
New guidelines, inserted in December 1993 (amendment 
No 9 to the Main Benefits Manual) now refer to "loss of 
employment because of theft or deliberate misuse of 
equipment, goods or money from the employer". In cases 
where there is no criminal prosecution for such behaviour, 
staff are instructed to seek legal advice from a departmen-
tal solicitor (Department of Social Welfare, 1993a, para 
10.5031). 
"Misconduct" 
What does 'because of misconduct' mean? Must miscon-
duct be the sole factor? 1be dominant reason? Or just one 
of a number of reasons? English decisions suggest that the 
misconduct must at least be a necessary element in the 
decision to dismiss (Calvert; Ogus and Barendt). 
The key question is the meaning of the word 'misconduct' 
itself. In terms of the contract of employment 'misconduct' 
is nonnally interpreted as referring to "conduct so seri-
ously in breach of the contract that by standards of fairness 
and justice the employer should not be bound to continue 
the employment" (North v Television Corporation Ltd 
( 1977) 11 ALR 599). This is reflected in the instructons to 
departmental staff in the Main Benefits Manual (Depart-
ment of Social Welfare, 1993a. para 10.5031). 
There is no fixed rule of law defining the degree of 
misconduct justifying dismissal (Clouston & Co v Corry 
[1906] AC 122, cited with approval in North Island Gro-
ceriesLtdv Hewin [1982] 2NZLR 176). Whilst it was said 
in North· s case that it would be "difficult to imagine a case 
of serious and wilful neglect which would not itself consti-
tute misconduct", any lesser degree of neglect would 
normally not be included in that term. 
Because the courts have tended to concentrate on whether 
the employee's action or inaction justified the employer's 
decision to terminate the contract, there has been no real 
need to define the concept of misconduct precisely or to 
distinguish it from other substantive causes for dismissal 
which lack the element of 'wilfulness' which seems to 
accompany most misconduct cases. For example, since 
extreme cases of negligence can give rise to a justified 
dismissal. there has been no need to decide whether, say, 
an oil tanker driver who lights a cigarette at a filling station 
is guilty of misconduct or negligence. One problem with 
s 60H(3) is that much can then turn on the arbitrary 
classification used by the adjudicator or judge in this 
context. 
In the context of s 60H(3), there is much to be said for 
confining the term "misconduct" to the meaning which it 
has acquired in employment law. This is particularly so 
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given the link between the stand-down period and 
determinations by any "~person or body authorised 
by law" as to wbethez the misconduct has been proved. 
The usual forum here will be the Employment Tnbunal or 
the Employment Co~ in the course of a personal griev-
ance complaint under the Employment Contracts Act 
1991. The wording would also cover an arbitrator operat-
ing under an alternative grievance procedure in an employ-
ment contract. 
The Department of Social Welfare's Main Benefits Manual 
originally gave as one example of misconduct "failure to 
supply output or quality of work having regard to the 
applicant's capabilities" (Department of Social Welfare, 
1993a, para 10.5031). This bordered on covering dis-
missal for lack of general competence or 'nous', which was 
held by the Court of Appeal to be outside the normal 
boundaries of misconduct justifying summary dismissal in 
Hewin's case. In new policy guidelines, operative from 
December 1993 (amendment no 9 to the Main Benefits 
Manual), that paragraph now refers to: "loss of employ-
ment because of deliberate failure to supply output or 
quality of work having regard to the applicant's capabili-
ties, rendering the conduct of the worker incompatible 
with the faithful discharge of his or her duty to the em-
ployer." 
The Manual adds that: ' 'There could be situations where an 
employer is entitled under employment law to dismiss a 
worker for misconduct, but where the 26-week period of 
non-entitlement should not be imposed. For example, 
dismissal for a lack of ability to do the job, where the 
person bad been workng to the best of ther ability." 
Whilst the distinction between deliberately bad work and 
simple lack of ability is apt, it should be noted that cases 
falling into the latter class have never been regarded as 
constituting misconduct for the purposes of employment 
law (see the treatment of Hewin's case, above). 
Nothing is to be gained from listing illustrations of miscon-
duct Examples abound in employment law (Mazengarb, 
paras [27 .27) and following). The Department of Social 
Welfare' s Main Benefits Manual lists ' 'persistent failure to 
follow prescribed safety practices", and loss of employ-
ment because of assault on a fellow worker or destruction 
of plant which amounts to serious misconduct. Again, if 
there is no criminal prosecution for such behaviour, staff 
are instructed to seek legal advice (Department of Social 
Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5031). A further example pro-
vided by the Manual is "loss of employment because of 
unauthorised absence for a lengthy period or persistent 
absenteeism". In SSAA Decision 9/93, unreported, in 
which a worker was dismissed after absence following a 
final warning, the imposition of a stand down was upheld 
by the Appeal Authority. 
In dealing with the stand-down for misconduct, the Main 
Benefits Manual stresses that: 
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• departmental staff should seek legal advice whenever 
there is doubt in assessing such cases (Department of 
Social Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5031); 
• that the examples in the Manual are only examples which 
could warrant dismissal (Department of Social Welfare, 
1993a, para 10.5031); and that 
• each case must be considered on its individual merits 
(Department of Social Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5033). 
Tbe employer's opinion 
When a person applies for an unemployment benefit, the 
past employer will be sent a form UB 5, "Verification of 
Employment", and asked the reasons for the termination 
of employment In relation to this process, the Main 
Benefits Manual notes that the employer will often request 
confidentiality when completing fonn UB5 but that this 
cannot be guaranteed because of the Official Information 
Act 1982 . If there is conflicting evidence, the employee 
must be advised of the reasons given by the employer if 
those reasons are the basis for the decision, despite the 
employer's request for confidentiality. Staff are told to 
give the applicant the benefit of the doubt where the actual 
cause of the dismissal is unclear (Department of Social 
Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5034). The Privacy Act 1993 also 
requires disclosure unless there is good reason to withhold 
information (Roth, 1994). There is also the right to a 
written statement of reasons for dismissal under s 38 of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Policy considerations 
As we have seen, the Depru bnent has a discretion whether 
to impose the stand-down where misconduct has been 
found to have led to dismissal The boundaries of that 
discretion are not set out in the legislation or in the Main 
Benefits Manual. However, the underlying policy behind 
the stand-down could be a relevant factor. Ogus and 
Barendt, 1980, point out that there might be three different 
approaches. First, there is 'punishment': that the dis-
missed worker must suffer for having transgressed. Sec-
ondly, there is 'suitability': that the benefit isonlythere for 
those whose unemployment is due to external forces. 
Thirdly, there is ' voluntary unemployment': that the ben-
efit is not there to support a worker who knew, or ought to 
have known, that his or her job would be lost as the result 
of misconduct Depending upon which basis is selected, 
different results might follow. 
Of the three, the third approach seems most in line with the 
Government's thinking. Introducing the bill, the Minister 
of Social Welfare described the stand-down as operating 
where workers ''put their own jobs in jeopardy through 
misconduct" and the Minister of Employment described 
the measme as involving "a massive disincentive to leav-
ing employment for the wrong reasons" (Hansard, Vol 
511, p 463). 
If the third approach does reflect the underlying policy, 
then it might be relevant to the exercise of the discretion to 
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ask whether the worker knew, or ought to have know~ that 
his er her job would be lost as the result of the alleged 
misconduct (for example, Was there a warning? Was the 
misconduct so gross that dismissal was an obvious out-
come? etc). The Department of Social Welfare's Main 
Benefits Manual suggests that the misconduct must have 
been sufficiently serious to have justified the dismissal 
(Department of Social Welfare, 1993a, para 10.5030). 
This approach has also been taken by the Appeal Authority 
which has indicated that an element of the proper exercise 
of discretion under s 60H(3) is to ask whether the conduct 
in question was sufficiently serious (and the consequences 
sufficiently foreseeable) to justify the exercise of the 
discretion to impose the stand down. In SSAA Decision 
No 34/93, unreporte<L because the appellant was taken to 
know that theft as a servant would lead almost invariably 
to dismissal, this being a 'widely accepted consequence', 
a stand down after dismissal on these grounds was upheld. 
The effect of contested dismissals 
Paragraph (d) enables the benefit to be granted where a 
contested dismissal which is proceeding under the per-
sonal grievance or other dispute resolution procedure, on 
the basis that the applicant ag~ees to repay all benefit paid 
if the misconduct is then proved in those proceedings. The 
Main Benefits Manual requires that the agreement be in 
writing (Department of Social Welfare, 1993a, para 
10.5036). 
There are a number of unresolved issues at this point 
(Black, Harrop, Hughes, 1994, para 1060H.16). First, 
what is the correct approach if the Tribunal or the Court 
finds the misconduct was proved, but that it did not justify 
dismissal? Paragraph (d) talks only of mandatory recovery 
of benefit where the misconduct has been proved, not 
where dismissal was justified. Suppose that an employer 
dismisses for misconduct which the Tribunal or the Court 
finds to be proved, but to be only trivial and not to supply 
justification for termination of the employment? This 
occurs regularly in practice. The apparent rationale for 
recovering the benefit ('voluntary unemployment') disap-
pears, but the mandatory nature of paragraph (d) means 
that the benefit is then repayable. This is clearly an 
undesirable result. 
Secondly, there is no procedure analogous to the grievance 
procedure for determining the correctness of a 'dismissal ' 
from a Government-assisted scheme (s 60H(3)(b)). If it 
cannot operate in these circumstances, can the discretion 
then properly be exercised under s 60H(3Xc)? In other 
words, is there a discretion at all? (Cheyne, 1992, 15) 
Thirdly, in terms of general policy, reliance on the findings 
of the Employment Tribunal or of the Employment Court 
may give rise to problems in terms of issue estoppel. There 
are different questions of law involved. The Tribunal and 
the Court are concerned to ascertain whether the employ-
er's conduct was justified. But for the purposes of s 60H(3) 
the question seems to be entirely one of fact: What moti-
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vated the employer, regardless of justification? Also, the 
burden of proof is different in the Employment Tribunal 
and Employment Court from that in the Social Secwity 
Appeal Authority, in which contemporaneous proceed-
ings may be launched. What happens, for example, if the 
Social Security Appeal Authority overtmns a departmen-
tal decision on the basis that there was no misconduct, but 
the Employment Tribunal finds that there was? Should 
one set of proceedings await the other and, if so, which? 
The problem will be exacerbated where theft is alleged and 
the criminal courts become involved. 
Ameliorating provisions 
Under s 60K of the 1964 Act, a stand-down imposed on a 
person because of voluntary unemployment, misconduct 
or failure to seek or to accept work will lapse if that person 
undertakes full employment for a total of six weeks during 
the 26 week period of non-entitlement 'Full employment' 
for the purposes of s 60K is defined as an average of at least 
30 hours a week (s 3 of the 1964 Act) and the weeks do not 
have to be worked in one block. The concept is defined to 
include both employment under a contract of service and 
self -employment carried on for pecuniary profit (although 
no actual profit is required by the definition). A new 
application after the six week period will attract the usual 
two week stand-down. 
Under s 60KA unemployment benefit can also be paid to 
a person who is subject to a stand-down if that person 
secures a place on a Community Taskforce programme 
and participates satisfactorily. After six weeks of satisfac-
tory participation in the programme, the remainder of the 
stand down lapses (s 60KA(3)). If participation is for less 
than six weeks, the period on the programme is deducted 
from the 26 week period (s 60K.A(2)). The Director-
General of Social Welfare has the authority to determine 
what is, or is not, satisfactory participation (s 60KA(5)). 
Under s 60L( 1) of the 1964 Act, persons stood down from 
unemployment benefit are also precluded from receiving 
emergency benefit, accommodation benefit or special 
benefit during the stand-down period. Section 60L pro-
vides that the 'spouse' of a person who is disqualified from 
receiving an unemployment benefit by reason of strike 
action or subject to a 26 week stand-down is entitled to an 
unemployment benefit at a special rate (subs (1)). This 
does not apply to the redundancy stand-down (subs (2)). 
Clearly. as well as penalising the applicant for a benefit, 
the stand-down rule also penalises the applicant's family. 
Normally, such a partner would qualify for an Wlemploy-
ment benefit in their own right However, s 60L(2) deals 
with the position of the partner of a person who is either not 
eligible because of strike action or has been stood down for 
misconduct, voluntary unemployment or refusal to seek 
work. The partner may be paid unemployment benefit at 
a special rate of half the married rate with no children 
during the period of non-entitlement (ie, at present $109.25 
per week). Entitlement to accommodation supplement is 
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assessed in the usual manner. 
Haniship assistance by way of special needs grant under s 
124 of the 1964 Act may be available, although the 
conditions f<r qualifying are stringent. The amount of 
such payments, and the qualifying conditions, are set out 
by Ministerial Direction under s 5 of the 1964 Act (re~ 
duced in the Appendices to Black, Harrop. Hughes, 1994 ). 
Social security and grievance awards 
Section 71 of the Social Security Act 1964 makes provi-
sion for circumstances in which a person has received 
compensation or damages in respect of disability, disease, 
or dismissal. enabling the benefit paid to take account of 
such a payment or, where the payment is prospective, to 
enable recovery of the benefit paid once the compensation 
has been received. Thus, where a person is proceeding 
with a personal grievance for unjustifiable dismissal, an 
unemployment benefit may be granted subject to the 
condition that the benefit will be repaid out of any compen-
sation received by the grievant (s 71(2)). 'Compensation' 
in this section is probably to be read in its generic sense as 
including awards of reimbursement, rather than as relating 
to compensation properly so called under s 40 of the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991. Thus, where such a 
condition is attached, the Tribunal and the Court should 
not, in principle, deduct a sum equivalent to any unem-
ployment benefit paid from an award of compensation or 
reimbursement (see, by analogy, United Food and Chemi-
cal Workers Union v J Wattie Foods L~ unreported, 
Employment C~ 12 December 1992, WEC 21/92). 
In order fors 71 to operate, the grant of benefit must have 
been conditional at the outset Thus, in SSAA Decision No 
67/93, unreported, where the Department had not made it 
apparent to the appellant that her benefit was conditional 
on such repayment, the Appeal Authority held that if the 
Director-General decides to exercise the discretion in 
favour of an applicant he/she must also impose the condi-
tion of repayment (of some or all of the benefit subse-
quently received) at the time of grant This would appear 
to place an onus on the Department to record the condition 
imposed with the advice of the grant of benefit and the 
Director-General has no power in s 71 to impose the 
condition of repayment subsequent to the granting of the 
benefit 
There is also an inter-relationship between s 71 and s 
60H(3)(d). Under the latter section, as we have seen, an 
unemployment benefit may be paid where an employee 
has been dismissed for alleged misconduct, on condition 
that it be repaid if the misconduct is found to be proved. 
'Compensation or damages' under s 71(2) includes ex 
gratia payments made in settlement This is presumably to 
defeat, for social security pwposes. the practice which had 
developed under earlier legislation of settling personal 
claims without an identifiable element of wage reimburse-
ment in the settlement figure, so as to avoid taxation on 
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wage reimbursement 
Social Secmity Appeal Authority Decision No 60/94, was 
an appeal from a decision to treat a lump sum payment 
from an employer as compensation for loss of income 
under s 71. On 4 June 1993, the appellant had tendered his 
resignation to the employer following some weeks of 
negotiation concerning his claim that he was being treated 
unfairly by his immediate superior. The settlement in-
cluded a month • s salary in lieu of notice, 11 days holiday 
pay, a lump sum representing three months' salary and a 
performance bonus of 100% of that to which he would 
have been entitled for the period 1 April1993 to 4 October 
1993. The principal issue was the Department' s decision 
to treat the lump sum as representing salary paid up to 4 
October 1993. Theeffectofthis,combined with the ' high 
income' stand down under s SOB meant that the appellant 
was disqualified from receiving an unemployment benefit 
until 31 December. some six months after he had left the 
employment 
The appellant argued that the lump sum should not be 
treated as lost income since it had been spent on lawyers • 
fees and removal costs incurred after his resignation. It 
was, he argued, compensation for a prospective personal 
grievance for discrimination which he would otherwise 
have brought against his former employer. The Depart-
ment conceded that the amount expended on obtaining 
compensation could be deducted from the total compensa-
tion received and included in this figure both the lawyers' 
fees and the removal costs. However, the effect of this 
concession was merely to reduce the proportion of the 
!ump sum deemed to be in compensation for loss of 
expectation of employment. 
The Social Security Appeal Authority held on this point 
that 
Notwithstanding the careful way in which the appel-
lant's settlement with his former employer was worded 
it is clear from other evidence provided that the amount 
which he received to settle his personal grievance was 
equivalent to three months salary. Part of the calcula-
tion involved the payment of 1 00% of the performance 
bonus to which the appellant would have been entitled 
for the period of 1 ApriJ to 4 October 1993. If that 
evidence was not available the Department remained 
entitled to calculate the same or a similar period for 
which it regarded the appellant as not entitled to a 
benefit because of the deeming provisions of s 7l{l)(a) 
and the provisions of s 71 (2) of the Act. The combined 
effect of these particular provisions enables the Depart-
ment to deem a certain period as covered by compensa-
tion received and it presumably would have done so by 
simply dividing the total received by the appellant's 
monthly base salary. 
The Appeal Authority held that the Department had exer-
cised its discretion reasonably in taking the appellant' s 
expenses on obtaining compensation into account and 
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deducting them from the total received. The Authority 
added "The fact that the appellant had spent the whole of 
the amount received in compensation before be was enti-
tled to receive the benefit is not relevant to the exercise of 
the discretion". 
1bis decision illustrates that those framing settlements of 
personal grievance cases have very limited options under 
s 71 of the 1964 Act where the level of compensation is 
pegged to periodic wage or salary payments. On the facts 
of the case, it is difficult to see bow the appellant could 
have escaped that provision. However, the ability simply 
to divide a settlement total by the applicant's monthly <K 
weekly base salary or wage should in principle be re-
stricted where the settlement figure expressly includes a 
compensatory element for humiliation, emotional trawna, 
etc, and this is not a sham to disguise a wage-based 
settlement Section 71 ( 1 )(a) clearly refers to the period of 
"loss of expectation of employment in respect of w bicb the 
compensation or damages have been paid". Compensa-
tion which is genuinely meant to cover humiliation or other 
emotional loss should not be included in the Department's 
calculations and to do so would arguably be an invalid 
exercise of the discretion. The inclusion of ex gratia 
payments within the definition of"compensation or dam-
ages" in subs (3) of s 71 does not override the need to assess 
the real basis of the payment. 
Future research 
1bis paper has aimed to provide a practical sketch of how 
the law is operating in this particular area Since the bulk 
of the paper is an updated version of material in current, 
and forthcoming, practitioner's texts (Mazengarb, and 
Blac~ Harrop, Hughes, respectively), theoretical perspec-
tives have not been advanced. There is a need for such a 
detailed theoretical study, particularly in the light of the 
sudden and marked changes in approach both to employ-
ment law and the law of social security in the past three 
years. Studies of the relationship between the changes to 
the social security system and this country's international 
treaty obligations are also in their infancy (Hunt, 1994 ). A 
detailed consideration of the formation and implementa-
tion of social secwity policy in the years 1990-1991 is also 
long overdue. 
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